HISTORIC SPEECHES
JOHN F. KENNEDY
Radio and
Television Address to the American People on the Nuclear
Test Ban Treaty
Washington, D.C.
July 26, 1963
Good evening, my fellow citizens: I speak to you tonight
in a spirit of hope.
Eighteen years ago the advent of nuclear weapons changed
the course of the world as well as the war. Since that
time, all mankind has been struggling to escape from the
darkening prospect of mass destruction on earth. In an
age when both sides have come to possess enough nuclear
power to destroy the human race several times over, the
world of communism and the world of free choice have been
caught up in a vicious circle of conflicting ideology and
interest. Each increase of tension has produced an increase
of arms; each increase of arms has produced an increase
of tension.
In these years, the United States and the Soviet Union
have frequently communicated suspicion and warnings to
each other, but very rarely hope. Our representatives have
met at the summit and at the brink; they have met in Washington
and in Moscow; in Geneva and at the United Nations. But
too often these meetings have produced only darkness, discord,
or disillusion.
Yesterday a shaft of light cut into the darkness. Negotiations
were concluded in Moscow on a treaty to ban all nuclear
tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water.
For the first time, an agreement has been reached on bringing
the forces of nuclear destruction under international control-a
goal first sought in 1946 when Bernard Baruch presented
a comprehensive control plan to the United Nations.
That plan, and many subsequent disarmament plans, large
and small, have all been blocked by those opposed to international
inspection. A ban on nuclear tests, however, requires on-the-spot
inspection only for underground tests. This Nation now
possesses a variety of techniques to detect the nuclear
tests of other nations which are conducted in the air or
under water, for such tests produce unmistakable signs
which our modern instruments can pick up.
The treaty initialed yesterday, therefore, is a limited
treaty which permits continued underground testing and
prohibits only those tests that we ourselves can police.
It requires no control posts, no on-site inspection, no
international body.
We should also understand that it has other limits as
well. Any nation which signs the treaty will have an opportunity
to withdraw if it finds that extraordinary events related
to the subject matter of the treaty have jeopardized its
supreme interests; and no nation's right of self-defense
will in any way be impaired. Nor does this treaty mean
an end to the threat of nuclear war. It will not reduce
nuclear stockpiles; it will not halt the production of
nuclear weapons; it will not restrict their use in time
of war.
Nevertheless, this limited treaty will radically reduce
the nuclear testing which would otherwise be conducted
on both sides; it will prohibit the United States, the
United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and all others who sign
it, from engaging in atmospheric tests which have so alarmed
mankind; and it offers to all the world a welcome sign
of hope.
For this is not a unilateral moratorium, but a specific
and solemn legal obligation. While it will not prevent
this Nation from testing underground, or from being ready
to conduct atmospheric tests if the acts of others so require,
it gives us a concrete opportunity to extend its coverage
to other nations and later to other forms of nuclear tests.
This treaty is in part the product of Western patience
and vigilance. We have made clear-most recently in Berlin
and Cuba our deep resolve to protect our security and our
freedom against any form of aggression. We have also made
clear our steadfast determination to limit the arms race.
In three administrations, our soldiers and diplomats have
worked together to this end, always supported by Great
Britain. Prime Minister Macmillan joined with President
Eisenhower in proposing a limited test ban in 1959, and
again with me in 1961 and 1962.
But the achievement of this goal is not a victory for
one side-it is a victory for mankind. It reflects no concessions
either to or by the Soviet Union. It reflects simply our
common recognition of the dangers in further testing.
This treaty is not the millennium. It will not resolve
all conflicts, or cause the Communists to forego their
ambitions, or eliminate the dangers of war. It will not
reduce our need for arms or allies or programs of assistance
to others. But it is an important first step-a step towards
peace-a step towards reason- a step away from war.
Here is what this step can mean to you and to your children
and your neighbors: First, this treaty can be a step towards
reduced world tension and broader areas of agreement. The
Moscow talks have reached no agreement on any other subject,
nor is this treaty conditioned on any other matter. Under-Secretary
Harriman made it clear that any non-aggression arrangements
across the division in Europe would require full consultation
with our allies and full attention to their interests.
He also made clear our strong preference for a more comprehensive
treaty banning all tests everywhere, and our ultimate hope
for general and complete disarmament. The Soviet Government
however, is still unwilling to accept the inspection such
goals require.
No one can predict with certainty, therefore, what further
agreements, if any, can be built on the foundations of
this one. They could include controls on preparations for
surprise attack, or on numbers and type of armaments. There
could be further limitations on the spread of nuclear weapons.
The important point is that efforts to seek new agreements
will go forward.
But the difficulty of predicting the next step is no reason
to be reluctant about this step. Nuclear test ban negotiations
have long been a symbol of East-West disagreement. If this
treaty can also be a symbol-if it can symbolize the end
of one era and the beginning of another-if both sides can
by this treaty gain confidence and experience in peaceful
collaboration- then this short and simple treaty may well
become an historic mark in man's age-old pursuit of peace.
Western policies have long been designed to persuade the
Soviet Union to renounce aggression, direct or indirect,
so that their people and all people may live and let live
in peace. The unlimited testing of new weapons of war cannot
lead towards that end-but this treaty, if it can be followed
by further progress, can clearly move in that direction.
I do not say that a world without aggression or threats
of war would be an easy world. It will bring new problems,
new challenges from the Communists, new dangers of relaxing
our vigilance or of mistaking their intent.
But those dangers pale in comparison to those of the spiraling
arms race and a collision course toward war. Since the
beginning of history, war has been mankind's constant companion.
It has been the rule, not the exception. Even a nation
so young and as peace-loving as our own has fought through
eight wars. And three times in the last two years and a
half I have been required to report to you as President
that this nation and the Soviet Union stood on the verge
of direct military confrontation-in Laos, in Berlin and
in Cuba.
A war today or tomorrow,
if it led to nuclear war, would not be like any war in
history. A full-scale nuclear exchange, lasting less
than 60 minutes, with the weapons now in existence, could
wipe out more than 300 million Americans, Europeans and
Russians, as well as untold millions elsewhere. And the
survivors, as Chairman Khrushchev warned the Communist
Chinese, "the survivors would envy the dead," For
they would inherit a world so devastated by explosion and
poison and fire that today we cannot even conceive of its
horrors. So let us try to turn the world away from war.
Let us make the most of this opportunity, and every opportunity,
to reduce tension, to slow down the perilous nuclear arms
race, and to check the world's slide toward final annihilation.
Second, this treaty can be a step towards freeing the
world from the fears and dangers of radioactive fallout.
Our own atmospheric tests last year were conducted under
conditions which restricted such fallout to an absolute
minimum. But over the years the number and the yield of
weapons tested have rapidly increased and so have the radioactive
hazards from such testing. Continued unrestricted testing
by the nuclear powers, joined in time by other nations
which may be less adept in limiting pollution, will increasingly
contaminate the air that all of us must breathe Even then,
the number of children and grandchildren with cancer in
their bones, with leukemia in their blood, or with poison
in their lungs might seem statistically small to some,
in comparison with natural health hazards. But this is
not a natural health hazard-and it is not a statistical
issue. The loss of even one human life, or the malformation
of even one baby-who may be born long after all of us have
gone-should be of concern to us all. Our children and grandchildren
are not merely statistics towards which we can be indifferent.
Nor does this affect the nuclear powers alone. These tests
befoul the air of all men and all nations, the committed
and the uncommitted alike, without their knowledge and
without their consent. That is why the continuation of
atmospheric testing causes so many countries to regard
all nuclear powers as equally evil; and we can hope that
its prevention will enable those countries to see the world
more clearly, while enabling all the world to breathe more
easily.
Third, this treaty can be a step towards preventing the
spread of nuclear weapons to nations not now possessing
them. During the next several years, in addition to the
four current nuclear powers, a small but significant number
of nations will have the intellectual, physical, and financial
resources to produce both nuclear weapons and the means
of delivering them. In time it is estimated, many other
nations will have either this capacity or other ways of
obtaining nuclear warheads, even as missiles can be commercially
purchased today.
I ask you to stop and think for a moment what it would
mean to have nuclear weapons in so many hands, in the hands
of countries large and small, stable and unstable, responsible
and irresponsible, scattered throughout the world. There
would be no rest for anyone then, no stability, no real
security, and no chance of effective disarmament. There
would be only be the increased chance of accidental war,
and an increased necessity for the great powers to involve
themselves in what otherwise would be local conflicts.
If only one thermonuclear bomb were to be dropped on any
American, Russian, or any other city, whether it was launched
by accident or design, by a madman or by an enemy, by a
large nation or by a small, from any corner of the world,
that one bomb could release more destructive power on the
inhabitants of that one helpless city than all the bombs
dropped in the Second World War.
Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union nor the
United Kingdom nor France can look forward to that day
with equanimity. We have a great obligation, all four nuclear
powers have a great obligation, to use whatever time remains
to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, to persuade other
countries not to test, transfer, acquire, possess, or produce
such weapons.
This treaty can be the opening wedge in that campaign.
It provides that none of the parties will assist other
nations to test in the forbidden environments. It opens
the door for further agreements on the control of nuclear
weapons, and it is open for all nations to sign, for it
is in the interest of all nations, and already we have
heard from a number of countries who wish to join with
us promptly.
Fourth and finally, this treaty can limit the nuclear
arms race in ways which, on balance, will strengthen our
Nation's security far more than the continuation of unrestricted
testing. For in today's world, a nation's security does
not always increase as its arms increase, when its adversary
is doing the same, and unlimited competition in the testing
and development of new types of destructive nuclear weapons
will not make the world safer for either side. Under this
limited treaty, on the other hand, the testing of other
nations could never be sufficient to offset the ability
of our strategic forces to deter or survive a nuclear attack
and to penetrate and destroy an aggressor's homeland.
We have, and under this treaty we will continue to have,
the nuclear strength that we need. It is true that the
Soviets have tested nuclear weapons of a yield higher than
that which we thought to be necessary, but the hundred
megaton bomb of which they spoke two years ago does not
and will not change the balance of strategic power. The
United States has chosen, deliberately, to concentrate
on more mobile and more efficient weapons, with lower but
entirely sufficient yield, and our security is, therefore,
not impaired by the treaty I am discussing.
It is also true, as Mr. Khrushchev would agree, that nations
cannot afford in these matters to rely simply on the good
faith of their adversaries. We have not, therefore, overlooked
the risk of secret violations. There is at present a possibility
that deep in outer space, that hundreds and thousands and
millions of miles away from the earth illegal tests might
go undetected. But we already have the capability to construct
a system of observation that would make such tests almost
impossible to conceal, and we can decide at any time whether
such a system is needed in the light of the limited risk
to us and the limited reward to others of violations attempted
at that range. For any tests which might be conducted so
far out in space, which cannot be conducted more easily
and efficiently and legally underground, would necessarily
be of such a magnitude that they would be extremely difficult
to conceal. We can also employ new devices to check on
the testing of smaller weapons in the lower atmosphere.
Any violation, moreover, involves, along with the risk
of detection, the end of the treaty and the worldwide consequences
for the violator.
Secret violations are possible and secret preparations
for a sudden withdrawal are possible, and, thus, our own
vigilance and strength must be maintained, as we remain
ready to withdraw and to resume all forms of testing, if
we must. But it would be a mistake to assume that this
treaty will be quickly broken. The gains of illegal testing
are obviously slight compared to their costs, and the hazard
of discovery, and the nations which have initialed and
will sign this treaty prefer it, in my judgment, to unrestricted
testing as a matter of their own self-interest, for these
nations, too, and all nations, have a stake in limiting
the arms race, in holding the spread of nuclear weapons,
and in breathing air that is not radioactive. While it
may be theoretically possible to demonstrate the risks
inherent in any treaty, and such risks in this treaty are
small, the far greater risks to our security are the risks
of unrestricted testing, the risk of a nuclear arms race,
the risks of new nuclear powers, nuclear pollution, and
nuclear war.
This limited test ban, in our most careful judgment, is
safer by far for the United States than an unlimited nuclear
arms race. For all these reasons, I am hopeful that this
Nation will promptly approve the limited test ban treaty.
There will, of course, be debate in the country and in
the Senate. The Constitution wisely requires the advice
and consent of the Senate to all treaties, and that consultation
has already begun. All this is as it should be. A document
which may mark an historic and constructive opportunity
for the world deserves an historic and constructive debate.
It is my hope that all of you will take part in that debate,
for this treaty is for all of us. It is particularly for
our children and our grandchildren, and they have no lobby
here in Washington. This debate will involve military,
scientific, and political experts, but it must be not left
to them alone. The right and the responsibility are yours.
If we are to open new doorways to peace, if we are to
seize this rare opportunity for progress, if we are to
be as bold and farsighted in our control of weapons as
we have been in their invention, then let us now show all
the world on this side of the wall and the other that a
strong America also stands for peace.
There is no cause for complacency. We have learned in
times past that the spirit of one moment or place can be
gone in the next. We have been disappointed more than once,
and we have no illusions now that there are shortcuts on
the road to peace. At many points around the globe the
Communists are continuing their efforts to exploit weakness
and poverty. Their concentration of nuclear and conventional
arms must still be deterred.
The familiar contest between choice and coercion, the
familiar places of danger and conflict, are all still there,
in Cuba, in Southeast Asia, in Berlin, and all around the
globe, still requiring all the strength and the vigilance
that we can muster. Nothing could more greatly damage our
cause than if we and our allies were to believe that peace
has already been achieved, and that our strength and unity
were no longer required.
But now, for the first
time in many years, the path of peace may be open. No
one can be certain what the future will bring. No one
can say whether the time has come for an easing of the
struggle. But history and our own conscience will judge
us harsher if we do not now make every effort to test
our hopes by action, and this is the place to begin.
According to the ancient Chinese proverb, "A journey
of a thousand miles must begin with a single step."
My fellow Americans, let us take that first step. Let
us, if we can, step back from the shadows of war and seek
out the way of peace. And if that journey is a thousand
miles, or even more, let history record that we, in this
land, at this time, took the first step.
Thank you, and good night.
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